Ben Bradley works primarily in ethical theory and the philosophy of death.

You can find more information at his website and at his page at academia.edu.

• (forthcoming) "Contemporary Consequentialist Theories of Virtue," in Nancy Snow (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Virtue (Oxford University Press).
• (2016) "Well-Being at a Time." Philosophic Exchange 45:1.
• (2016) “Character and Consequences,” in Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character (Oxford University Press).
• (2016) “Well-Being and Death,” in Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being (Routledge Publishing Co.), pp. 320-328.
• (2015) "Existential Terror." The Journal of Ethics 19: 409-418.
• (2015) “Is Death Bad for a Cow?” in Tatjana Visak and Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals (Oxford University Press), pp, 51-64.
• (2015) “How Should We Feel About Death?” Philosophical Papers 44: 1-14.
• (2015) “Why Leave Nature Alone?” in Avram Hiller, Leonard Kahn, and Ramona Ilea (eds.), Consequentialism and Environmental Ethics (Routledge Publishing Co.), pp. 92-103.
• (2014) “Objective Theories of Well-Being,” in Dale Miller and Ben Eggleston (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 199-215.
• (2013) “Death and Desires,” with Kris McDaniel, in James S. Taylor (ed.), The Ethics and Metaphysics of Death: New Essays (Oxford University Press), pp. 118-133.
• (2013) “Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating,” TheJournal of Ethics 17: 37-49.
• (2013) “Intrinsic Value,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Blackwell), edited by Hugh LaFollette.
• (2013) “Instrumental Value,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Blackwell), edited by Hugh LaFollette.
• (2013) “Philosophical Utilitarianism,” The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism (Bloomsbury), edited by James Crimmins, pp. 408-410.
• (2012) "Doing Away With Harm," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 390-412.
• (2012) "Fischer on Death and Unexperienced Evils," Philosophical Studies 158: 507-13.
• (2012) "Goodness and Justice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 233-43.
• (2011) "Narrativity, Freedom, and Redeeming the Past", Social Theory and Practice 37: 47-62.
• (2010) "Eternalism and Death's Badness", in Campbell, O'Rourke and Siverstein (eds.) Time and Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 271-81.
• (2010) "Benatar and the Logic of Betterness", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, March 2010
• (2010) Review of The Philosophy of Death by Steven Luper, Times Literary Supplement, October 1, p. 29.
• (2010) Review of Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism by Fred Feldman, Utilitas 22: 232-4.
• (2010) Review of The Philosophy of Death by Steven Luper, Ethics 120: 395-98.
• (2009) "Saving People and Flipping Coins", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, vol. 3, no. 1
• (2008) "Desires", with Kris McDaniel, Mind 117: 267-302
• (2008) "The Worst Time to Die", Ethics 118: 291-314
• (2007) "How Bad is Death?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37: 111-127
• (2007) "A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare", Philosophical Studies 133: 45-53
• (2007) Review of A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good by Robert Merrihew Adams, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May).
• (2006) "Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: 111-130
• (2006) "Against Satisficing Consequentialism", Utilitas 18: 97-108
• (2005) "Virtue Consequentialism", Utilitas 17: 282-298
• (2005) "'Doing and Allowing' and Doing and Allowing", with Michael Stocker, Ethics 115: 799-808
• (2005) Review of Reasons and the Fear of Death by R.E. Ewin, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 293-295.
• (2004) "When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?", Nous 38: 1-28
• (2004) Critical Notice of The Nature of Intrinsic Value by Michael Zimmerman, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 492-494.
• (2002) "Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?", Philosophical Studies 107: 23-44
• (2001) "The Value of Endangered Species", The Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 43-58
• (1998) "Extrinsic Value", Philosophical Studies 91: 109-126