1. Skip to navigation
  2. Skip to content
  3. Skip to sidebar
vangulick-robert.jpg
Email: rnvangul@syr.edu

----------------------

522 Hall of Languages
Phone: 315-443-5828

Philosophy
541 Hall of Languages
Phone: 315-443-2245

references

Robert Van Gulick

Professor of Philosophy

Research and Teaching Interests

Robert Van Gulick's work has focused on the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, including such topics as mental representation, intentional content, reduction, emergence, self-consciousness, and mental causation. He is the Director of the University's Cognitive Science Program and has been the President of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2001-02). He has twice rececived NEH Fellowships and has seved as the William P. Tolley Distingusihed Professor of Teaching in the Humanities.







__________________________________________________
 


Selected Publications

Articles

• Consciousness and Cognition. In S. Stich and E. Margolis (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford: OUP (forthcoming)

• Subjective consciousness and self-representation. Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).

• Drugs, mental instruments and self-control.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences (forthcoming).

• Non-reductive physicalism and the teleo-pragmatic theory of mind, Philosophia Naturalis 47/48: 1-2, 103-23 (2010/11).

• Life, holism and emergence: converging themes. Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming).

 • Concepts of Consciousness. In T. Bayne. A. Cleermans, P. Wiklen (eds.) Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).

 • Functionalism. In. B. McLauglin and A. Beckerman (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 128-51 (2009)

• Jackson’s change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argument. In I. Ravenscroft (ed.) Minds, Worlds and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 189-218 (2009).

 • Functionalism and qualia. In M. Velmans and S. Schnieider (eds). Blackwells Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwells Publishing, 181-95 (2007).

• What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:5-6,

           528-529, (2007).

‘Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All?’ in Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. (MIT Press, 2006).

‘Consciousness.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004).

‘Higher-Order Global States (Hogs): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.’ in Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins (2004).

‘So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary.’ in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. (MIT Press, 2004).

‘Beautiful Red Squares’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1) (2003), pp. 50-51.

‘Maps, Gaps, and Traps.’ in Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. (Oxford University Press, 2003).

‘Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10) (2001), pp. 1-34.

‘Still Room for Representations’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5) (2001), pp. 1007-1008.

‘Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness’ Philosophical Topics 28 (2000), pp. 275-305.

‘Is the Higher Order of Linguistic Thought Model of Feeling Adequate?’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2) (200), pp. 218-219.

‘Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments’ in Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. (MIT Press, 1999).

‘Out of Sight but Not Out of Mind: Isomorphism and Absent Qualia’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6) (1999), pp. 974-974.

‘Vehicles, Processes, and Neo-Classical Revival’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1) (1999), pp. 170-171.

‘Analytical Isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6) (1998), pp. 776-777.

‘How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness’ Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995), pp. 271-89.

‘Are Beliefs Brain States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?’ Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3) (1994), pp. 205-15.

‘Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?’ in John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. (Oxford University Press, 1993).

‘A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness’ Philosophical Review 97 (April) (1988), pp. 149-88.