Ben Bradley
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Research and Teaching Interests
Ben Bradley is chair of the Philosophy Department. He works primarily in ethical theory and the philosophy of death. His book, Well-Being and Death, was recently published by Oxford University Press. He recently co-edited a collection for OUP, the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. He has recently been working on articles on the objectivity of well-being, the nature of harm, and the value of nature.
You can find some of his papers on his page at academia.edu.
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Selected Publications
Books
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, co-edited with Fred Feldman and Jens Johansson (Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Well Being and Death (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009)
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- (forthcoming) “Death and Desires,” with Kris McDaniel, in James S. Taylor (ed.), Death: New Essays on Metaphysical and Ethical Issues Surrounding Death (Oxford University Press).
- (forthcoming) "Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming, and Creating," The Journal of Ethics.
- (2012) "Doing Away With Harm," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 390-412.
- (2012) "Fischer on Death and Unexperienced Evils," Philosophical Studies 158: 507-13.
- (2012) "Goodness and Justice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 233-43.
- (2011) "Narrativity, Freedom, and Redeeming the Past", Social Theory and Practice 37: 47-62.
- (2010) "Eternalism and Death's Badness", in Campbell, O'Rourke and Siverstein (eds.) Time and Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 271-81.
- (2010) "Benatar and the Logic of Betterness", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, March 2010
- (2009) "Saving People and Flipping Coins", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, vol. 3, no. 1
- (2008) "Desires", with Kris McDaniel, Mind 117: 267-302
- (2008) "The Worst Time to Die", Ethics 118: 291-314
- (2007) "How Bad is Death?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37: 111-127
- (2007) "A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare", Philosophical Studies 133: 45-53
- (2006) "Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: 111-130
- (2006) "Against Satisficing Consequentialism", Utilitas 18: 97-108
- (2005) "Virtue Consequentialism", Utilitas 17: 282-298
- (2005) "'Doing and Allowing' and Doing and Allowing", with Michael Stocker, Ethics 115: 799-808
- (2004) "When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?", Nous 38: 1-28
- (2002) "Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?", Philosophical Studies 107: 23-44
- (2001) "The Value of Endangered Species", The Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 43-58
- (1998) "Extrinsic Value", Philosophical Studies 91: 109-126