Skip to main content
André Gallois

André Gallois


Professor
Philosophy

agallois@syr.edu




Research and Teaching Interests

André Gallois' main areas of interest are metaphysics (particularly the metaphysics of time and identity), philosophy of mind and epistemology. He has authored two books: Occasions of Identity on problems about persistence and identity, and The World Without the Mind Within on issues about self-knowledge. In addition, he has published a number of journal articles on a wide range of issues including: Free Agency, Newcomb's Problem, Berkeley, Scepticism, the Cogito, Introspection, Perception and the Philosophy of Time. He has been the recipient of a research grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Board, and has contributed articles on the de re/de dicto distinction and on sense data to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Selected Publications

Books

Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness (New York : Oxford University Press, 1998).

The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Articles

‘The Fixity of Reasons,’ Philosophical Studies 146 (2) (2009).

‘Consciousness, Reasons, and Moore’s Paradox’ in Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person (eds.) M. Green & J. N. Williams (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2007), pp. 165-88.

‘Identity Over Time.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005).

‘Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3) (2004), pp. 648–657.

‘Langford and Ramachandran on Occasional Identities.’ Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204) (2001), pp. 378-385.

‘The Indubitability of the Cogito,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4) (2000), pp. 363–384.

‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1) (1998), pp. 263–283.

‘Can an Anti-Realist Live with the Past?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3) (1997), pp. 288 – 303.

'Deflationary Self-Knowledge' in Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind (eds.) M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 49-63.

‘Asymmetry in Attitudes and the Nature of Time,’ Philosophical Studies 76 (1) (1994).

‘Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1) (1993), pp. 36 – 46.

‘Ramachandran on Restricting Rigidity,’ Mind 102 (405) (1993), pp. 151-155.

‘Reply to Ramachandran,’ Mind 102 (405) (1993), pp. 159-162.

‘Occasional Identity,’ Philosophical Studies 58 (3) (1990).

‘Carter on Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation,’ Mind 97 (386) (1988), pp. 273-278.

‘Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity,’ Mind 95 (377) (1986), pp. 57-76.

‘Would It Have Been Me?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3) (1984), pp. 292 – 293 (with Robert Elliot).

‘True Believers and Radical Sceptics,’ Philosophia 14 (3-4) (1984), pp. 349-368.

‘Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism,’ Philosophical Studies 32 (July) (1977), pp. 99-105.

‘Berkeley’s Master Argument,’ Philosophical R